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1. Introduction 
As in other developing countries, rural Ethiopian households are exposed to a variety of natural, 
economic and health risks (Yilma et al., 2014).  Continued dependence on rain-fed agriculture as 
the main livelihood source (Di Falco et al., 2011; Tilahun et al., 2011) coupled with the lack of 
well-developed credit and insurance markets, intensifies the effects of these risks.  For instance, 
in the absence of health insurance, exposure to a health shock may lead to borrowing and selling 
of assets and reinforce existing poverty and in turn harm the ability of households to cope with 
non-health related risks. The potential interplay and mutually reinforcing negative effects of 
different types of shocks suggests that effective social protection may require the simultaneous 
implementation of multiple interventions. 
There is a large literature which has examined the effect of specific social protection 
instruments. For instance, in the context of low and middle income countries a number of 
papers have demonstrated the effect of cash transfer programs on nutrition, health and 
educational outcomes (Behrman and Hoddinott, 2005; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Gertler, 
2004), the effect of public works programs on asset-building, climatic risks and food security 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Gilligan et al., 2009; Subbarao, 2003; Subbarao, 1997; Ravallion, 1991) 
and the effect of health insurance schemes on health care utilization and financial protection on 
the one hand (Limwatthananon et al., 2015; Mebratie et al., 2013; Klohn and Strupat, 2013;  
Bender, 2011; Baeza and Packard, 2006; Escobar et al., 2010; Pagán et al., 2007; Wagstaff and 
Pradhan, 2005) and on borrowing and assets sales on the other (Yilma et al., 2015).  
Despite this large body of work, papers which have examined the inter-linkages between 
different social protection instruments and the joint effect of participating in multiple social 
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interventions on welfare outcomes are scarce.1 Indeed, based on their analysis of intervention 
programs operating in seven countries, Slater et al. (2016) point out that there is limited 
coordination between agricultural and social protection programs even though they often target 
similar households and have similar aims.  Recent policy declarations also urge greater cross-
sectoral coordination and call for social protection interventions to be integrated within broader food 
security and nutrition programming (Committee on World Food Security, 2012). To investigate the 
payoff from combining interventions, Daidone et al. (2015) analyse the joint effect of Malawi’s, 
Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) and Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP), which target 
poor and ultra-poor households, on household expenditure and production. They find that 
participation in both programs has a larger effect on production (22%) and on expenditure 
(15%) as compared to the sum of the individual effects. In contrast to these complementary 
effects, in their analysis of the joint impact of a cash transfer program and a livestock insurance 
scheme in Northern Kenya, Jensen et al. (2015) find no evidence of positive synergies. They 
attribute this to the minor overlap in coverage between the two programs. Similarly, in their 
analysis of the joint effects of a conditional cash transfer program (PROGRESA) and a program 
linked to agricultural production (PROCAMPO), Handa et al. (2010) tend to find zero effects 
except in the case of health visits where there is a negative effect which the authors attributed to 
time conflicts. 
In the Ethiopian context, Berhane et al. (2014) examine the effect of the Productive 
Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the community-based nutrition (CBN) program in localities 
where both schemes are operating. Their investigation reveals that there are no joint effects on 
various indicators of child nutrition. However, they also point out that the two schemes are 
“loosely meshed” and are co-located but not linked programmatically. While our paper also 
                                                     
1 A related body of literature examines the bundling of health insurance with microfinance loans (Banerjee et al., 
2014; Hamid et al., 2011; Ranson et al., 2006). Evidence on the effectiveness of such an approach is mixed. For 
instance, Banerjee et al. (2014) find that the poor quality of the insurance product leads to negative effects and a 
withdrawal from the microfinance scheme.  In contrast, Hamid et al. (2011) find that microcredit clients who had 
access to health insurance were more likely to be food sufficient as compared to microcredit clients who did not 
have access to the insurance product. 
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focuses on Ethiopia, there are differences in terms of the scheme interactions that we explore 
and the context.  
In 2005, in order to enhance food security in chronically food-insecure areas, the 
government of Ethiopia launched the PSNP which requires labor contributions in return for 
payments in cash or kind. In 2011, to enhance access to health care and provide financial 
protection the government launched a pilot voluntary Community Based Health Insurance 
(CBHI) scheme. In related work, Shigute et al. (2017) have examined whether participation in the 
PSNP may be used to encourage CBHI uptake.2 Motivated by the findings that PSNP 
participants are substantially more likely to enroll in the CBHI and by the limited research on the 
joint effects of multiple social interventions as well as the potential offered by program-bundling 
in enhancing social protection, this paper examines the joint effect of the PSNP and the CBHI 
on various outcomes. While a more detailed discussion of the potential interactions between the 
two schemes appears later in the text, consistent with the motivation for launching the CBHI we 
expect that individuals and households enrolled in the CBHI scheme will be more likely to use 
heath care and less likely to rely on asset sales and borrowing to finance health care. Similarly, we 
expect that since they receive payments in lieu of their labor contributions, PSNP participants 
will have higher off-farm labor contributions but should also be less likely to rely on asset sales 
and borrowing in the event of shocks that threaten food security. Thus, the paper focuses on the 
effects of the two schemes on health care utilization, off-farm labor supply, asset accumulation 
and borrowing. 
The paper relies on three rounds of individual panel data. The first edition of the 
individual data was collected in 2011, that is, before the launch of the CBHI and subsequent 
rounds were collected in 2012 and 2013. We also draw on qualitative information collected 
through key informant interview and focus group discussions conducted in 2012, 2014 and 2017. 
To preview our results, we find that individuals covered by both programs as compared to those 
                                                     
2 Shigute et al. (2017) find that PSNP participation increases the probability of enrolling in the CBHI by 24 
percentage points and increases renewal by 10 percentage points. 
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not covered by either of the programs, are 5 percentage points more likely to use outpatient care 
from modern providers and are 21 percentage points more likely to participate in off-farm work. 
Furthermore, participation in both programs is associated with a 5 percent increase in livestock, 
the main household asset, and a 27 percent decline in debt.  
The paper unfolds by providing in the next section a brief description of the two 
programs. Section 3 discusses the data while section 4 outlines an analytical and an empirical 
framework. Section 5 discusses the findings while section 6 contains concluding observations.  
2. A brief overview of the PSNP and the CBHI 
This paper investigates the joint effects of two important social protection schemes, the PSNP 
and the CBHI on various outcomes in Ethiopia. The PSNP is the Ethiopian government’s 
flagship food security program and the CBHI, which has been rapidly scaled up since its 
introduction in 2011, is expected to help households deal with the costs of financing health care.  
The following paragraphs describe the key features of the two programs. 
2.1 The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) 
Before 2005, efforts to enhance food security and deal with natural disasters, chiefly drought, 
were based on providing emergency assistance (MoARD 2009a, MoARD 2005). With the 
objective of relieving households from dependence on emergency assistance, the government in 
collaboration with donor agencies designed the PSNP. The PSNP attempts to shift the trend 
from meeting short term food needs to addressing the root causes of food insecurity by building 
durable community assets – mainly natural resource management projects designed to reduce 
soil erosion, control floods and harvest and conserve water (MoARD 2009b, MoARD 2010).  
The program focuses on food insecure households residing in food insecure areas. 
Participation is not voluntary but is based on a combination of geographical and community-
based targeting. At the first stage, government officials identify food-insecure districts on the 
basis of previous food aid allocation data. Within districts, local administrators identify 
chronically food-insecure villages and allocate the PSNP resources within these villages. 
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Household-level targeting is based on selecting households who have received emergency aid in 
the past and on other criteria such as assets (landholdings, livestock), income from non-
agricultural activities and from alternative sources of employment. However, communities have 
the discretion to modify this approach and to annually update their lists of food-insecure 
households based on local conditions.  
The program differentiates between two types of beneficiaries - direct support and public 
works - and offers support in cash or in kind to eligible households with no able-bodied 
members while public works beneficiaries receive payments on the basis of their labour 
contributions to public works projects.3 In the short run, the program expects to enhance food 
security by meeting the immediate needs of food insecure households and in the medium to 
longer run by preventing sales of productive assets and promoting sustainable livelihoods 
through the construction of rural infrastructure.  
Unlike previous food security efforts, a key objective of the PSNP in its current design is 
to integrate existing and future development interventions. As stated in the Program 
Implementation Manual (MoARD, 2010: 6), “The PSNP is not a project but a key element of 
local development planning.” This approach has been re-emphasized in the most recent PSNP 
design document (MoA, 2014: 3) which aims to ensure that “poor and vulnerable households 
benefit from an essential suite of services including safety net transfers, livelihood interventions, 
key health and nutrition services, community assets constructed through public works and 
support to households up to, during and beyond safety net graduation to ensure that the 
improvements they have achieved are sustainable.”  
2.2 Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) 
                                                     
3 The latter component accounts for 70 to 85 percent of the total beneficiaries (about 6 million individuals) and 
budget (MoARD 2010, MoARD 2011). The program operates in 319 food insecure districts (40% of the total 
districts) in eight regions of the country (MoARD, 2011; FDRE, 2012).  In 2013-14 the program had a cash budget 
of about $205 million and access to 274,844 metric tonnes of food. 
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Over the past decade, Ethiopia has invested heavily in its rural health infrastructure and recorded 
notable progress in a number of population health outcomes (see Mebratie et al., 2015). For 
instance child mortality per 1,000 live births has fallen from 166 in 2000 to 88 in 2011 and 
maternal mortality rates have declined from 871 to 676 per 100,000 live births (Mebratie et al. 
2015 and Federal Ministry of Health, 2011). Despite these improvements and investments in 
infrastructure, as is evident from the figures, challenges remain. Despite increases in utilization of 
some specific services, overall utilization rates remain low. According to the Ethiopian 
Demographic and Health Survey, in 2011, annual per capita outpatient health care utilization was 
about 0.3 visits, that is, 3 visits for every 10 persons. This low utilization rate is accompanied by a 
high reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments to finance health care.4 In particular, Yilma et al. 
(2014) show that households finance health care, in decreasing order of importance, by 
dissaving, asset sales and borrowing.5  
In response to this situation, in June 2011, in an attempt to enhance access to health care 
and help defray costs care while at the same time preventing the use of harmful coping strategies 
(asset sales, borrowing), the government launched, as a pilot, a voluntary CBHI in 13 districts, of 
which 9 are classified as food insecure and are also covered by the PSNP.6  The CBHI scheme 
covers outpatient and inpatient health care services in public health facilities and does not cover 
treatment with largely cosmetic value. Monthly contributions for core household members 
(parents and minor children), varies between Birr 10.50 (US$ 0.56) to Birr 15 (US$0.80) per 
month with an additional monthly premium of 2.10 to 3 Birr per non-core household member. 
Average monthly premiums amount to about 0.5 percent of household monthly income. There 
are no co-payments or deductibles (for additional details, see Mebratie et al. 2015).   
                                                     
4 FMoH (2010) estimates that local and international donors finance about 40% of health care, out-of-pocket (OOP) 
expenditure accounts for about 37% and central and local governments cover about 21% of the expenditure. The 
remainder (about 2%) is covered by employer and other private insurance schemes. 
 
5 Support from social networks is limited and households do not appear to resort to increasing labor supply or 
reducing consumption.  
 
6 The pilot CBHI was offered to about 300,000 households or about 1.8 million individuals. 
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While the scheme is government-driven there is a degree of community engagement in 
scheme management and supervision. At the design phase, regional governments were involved 
in determining benefit packages, registration fees, and premium payments. The roll-out phase 
involved a two-step process, with first the community deciding whether to participate in the 
scheme and subsequently households choose whether to enrol or not. Based on our survey data, 
in 2013, almost 51% percent of individuals in the pilot districts had enrolled in the scheme. 
3. Data  
The paper is based on three rounds of panel data. The first round was collected in March-April 
2011, that is, a few months before the launch of the CBHI while subsequent rounds were 
collected in March-April 2012 and March-April 2013. Data collection followed a stratified 
sampling design and the survey was fielded in sixteen districts located in four main regions of the 
country (Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and SNNPR). Within each district, six villages were randomly 
selected and within each village 17 households were randomly surveyed, yielding a total sample 
of 1,632 households. The follow-up survey in 2012 revisited 1,599 households and the 2013 
edition covered 1,583 households (3% attrition). The analysis reported in the paper focuses on 
working-age adults (aged 15 to 65) and is based on an unbalanced panel of 12,820 observations.7  
In each region the survey covered three CBHI pilot districts and one non-pilot district. 
The non-pilot districts were chosen based on the same criteria used to select the pilot districts. 
Of the sixteen districts there are 9 districts where both the CBHI and the PSNP operate, 3 where 
the CBHI operates but not the PSNP and 4 where the PSNP operates but the CBHI was not 
offered (see Table A1). The questionnaire included questions on PSNP and CBHI membership, 
modules on individual and household socio-economic characteristics and demographics, assets, 
employment, consumption expenditure, health and health care use, access to credit, social 
networks, and shocks.      
                                                     
7 The year-specific number of observations is 4,332 individuals in 2011; 4,337 in 2012; 4,151 in 2013 (see Table 3). 
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We also collected three rounds of qualitative information through key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). These were conducted in 2012, 2014 and in 
2017. Among other topics these interviews and discussions focused on factors that determine 
participation in the CBHI and the experience of officials and FGD participants with the two 
interventions. 
4. Analytical framework and empirical approach  
4.1 Analytical Framework 
Our objective is to examine whether participating in both the CBHI and the PSNP provides 
additional protection to households as compared to participating in only one of the schemes or 
as compared to not participating in either of the schemes.  Potentially, the two schemes may 
have an effect on a variety of outcomes, and based on the main channels through which they are 
expected to operate, this section outlines and motivates the key outcomes that are the focus of 
this paper.  
The main aim of the CBHI is to enhance access to health care use and to protect 
households against the costs of financing health care. As shown in Yilma et al. (2014), in the 
absence of access to insurance, households meet their health expenses by reducing savings, 
borrowing and selling assets. Informal insurance arrangements and support from family and 
friends in the form of remittances are not a major source of support. Hence, it may be expected 
that insurance will work not only towards enhancing access to health care but will also allow 
households to reduce their reliance on borrowing and avoid asset sales.8   
The PSNP is expected to enhance food security by providing payments for labor 
contributions. It is also expected to prevent households from borrowing and resorting to asset 
sales during times of crises. Thus, simply due to the needs of the scheme, PSNP participants may 
be expected to provide more off-farm labor as compared to non-participants. Furthermore, 
                                                     
8 Indeed, Yilma et al. (2015) show that participation in the CBHI leads to a reduction in borrowing while there are 
no effects on asset holdings. Whether participation in both the CBHI and the PSNP enhances these effects is the 
subject of this paper. 
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these labor contributions are important not only from the perspective of households but also 
from the perspective of PSNP program managers as labor is needed to construct public works. 
As discussed in Shigute et al. (2017), participation in the PSNP has a strong effect on CBHI 
uptake and a part of this may be attributed to the keen sense of the links between the two 
programs as perceived by officials. For instance, based on the qualitative information gathered 
through the key informant interviews we found that government officials have been taking 
measures to integrate different development interventions such as agricultural extension, 
education, and health programs. In particular, health extension workers focus on PSNP 
beneficiaries and during PSNP-related meetings or while workers are taking a break from their 
PSNP work, they provide information on personal hygiene and sanitation, child and maternal 
health issues and health insurance. They also encourage PSNP beneficiaries to enroll. This 
approach is illustrated by a statement made by a key informant in the Tigray region, 
“Continuous education on health issues including about the recently introduced community-
based health insurance scheme is provided to those people who are covered under PSNP. 
Moreover, during the distribution of PSNP payments, the participants are asked if they would 
like to register for CBHI..” [Interviewed in December 2012]. 
More recently, in fieldwork conducted in May 2017 in SNNPR district, key informants at the 
woreda and the regional level argued that being a member of the CBHI delivers greater benefits 
for PSNP members since they are food insecure and they cannot afford to cover unexpected 
expenses of health shocks. 
Not only are PSNP participants encouraged to enroll but officials expect enrolment to 
translate into greater health care utilization, quicker recovery from their illnesses and influence 
the ability of the PSNP participants to provide labor. During a discussion on the CBHI scheme a 
key informant in Oromia region remarked, 
“We inform PSNP members to join the [CBHI] scheme because we want them to get immediate 
treatment when they get sick. If they are not treated immediately, it affects their performance in 
public works. These beneficiaries do development work and we don't want them to fall sick so 
the idea is if they buy insurance and get care then it may also improve their health outcomes” 
[Interviewed in October 2014]. 
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At the village level the same government officials are responsible for implementing both the 
PSNP and the CBHI and this clearly provides an incentive for officials to push both schemes. 
CBHI uptake is expected to encourage timely access to health care and might reduce illness-
related losses in labour contributions which are needed to build rural infrastructure through the 
PSNP. Timely access to health care implies that PSNP participants who are also CBHI members 
may be expected to provide more labor as compared to non-CBHI, PSNP participants. 
The potential links between the two programs is not restricted to officials and a focus 
group discussion participant in Oromia remarked, 
 “I can feed my family with the payment I get from PSNP PW and my kids can go to school not 
worrying about whether and what they will eat. Because of my CBHI, I and my kids can get 
proper treatment whenever we get sick. If it wasn't for CBHI I might have to go around my 
neighborhood and ask for borrowing which is very difficult” [Discussed in September 2014]. 
 
Discussing her own situation, another individual in the discussion pointed out that,   
“I am the head of my household. Before I enrolled in the CBHI, I used to be absent from public works for 
days when either myself or my kids get sick. I used to run into arguments during payments justifying my 
long absence to the foreman. Going to the health center was not easy for my family. When they informed 
us about CBHI, I was the first one to enroll. Now, thanks to my membership, I don’t get any more 
complaints for being absent as I immediately go to the health center when either I or my children get 
health problems and continue working on the public works. I now tell my non-CBHI neighbors to enroll 
in the scheme” [Discussed in September 2014]. 
 
Similarly, a focus group discussion participant in SNNPR articulated the links between the two 
schemes and stated that the CBHI is a very useful intervention for food insecure households, 
“So far we used to get some money from PSNP in order to purchase food. Now we are getting 
health services almost for free after joining CBHI. What shall I say simply I would like to thank 
God.”  [Discussed in May 2017]. 
Overall, the CBHI on its own is expected to lead to an increase in health care utilization 
and to protect households from resorting to borrowing and asset sales. The PSNP is expected to 
lead to an increase in off-farm labor and through provision of payments in lieu of labor it is 
expected to prevent food-insecure households from borrowing and selling assets to meet their 
consumption needs. Given the partially overlapping aims of the two interventions and the 
potential linkages between the PSNP and the CBHI we expect that those who participate in both 
the PSNP and the CBHI will provide more off-farm labor, they should also be less likely to take 
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up a loan and to sell assets in order to cope with shocks.9 With regard to assets, in the empirical 
work we focus on livestock as it is the most important asset for Ethiopian rural households.10  
4.2 Empirical approach 
Based on the preceding discussion, the empirical analysis focuses on examining the joint effects 
of the two programs on health care use, off-farm labor, livestock assets and borrowing. To 
identify the joint effects of the CBHI and PSNP we exploit individual-level panel data and 
estimate several variants of a difference-in-difference (DiD) model. That is,  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (𝐶𝐵𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑃)𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝐵𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾 + 𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝜂 + 𝑇𝑡𝜃 + 
                           (𝑊 ∗ 𝑇)𝑗𝑡𝜎 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,       (1) 
where, 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡, represents the outcome of interest for individual i residing in woreda j at time t, the 
interaction term (𝐶𝐵𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑃)𝑖𝑗𝑡 indicates participation in both the CBHI and the PSNP (both 
are binary variables), while CBHI and PSNP indicates participation in only one of the two 
programs, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of time-variant observables.
11 We include two sets of time effects, 
𝑇𝑡 represents a time fixed effect, (𝑊 ∗ 𝑇)𝑗𝑡 is a woreda-specific time-effect, 𝜆𝑖 is an individual 
fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a time-variant individual error term.
12 The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽 
which indicates the additional effect of participating in both the PSNP and the CBHI as 
compared to participating in only one of the two schemes.   
                                                     
9 While the channels through which the PSNP and CBHI are expected to influence borrowing and assets are self-
evident, the expected effects of the CBHI on labor supply are perhaps not as straightforward. Our expectation 
buttressed by the qualitative interviews is that the CBHI increases timely use of health care use and consequently 
reduces the incidence or duration of illnesses and thereby raise labor supply. Unfortunately, we do not have 
sufficiently accurate information on the sickness history of individuals to demonstrate that access to health care has 
prevented illnesses or reduced illness durations. 
 
10 According to Dercon (2004), in rural Ethiopia, “livestock is by far the most important marketable asset and 
typically is accounting for more than 90% of the value of assets”.     
 
11 The vector of time varying variables includes demographic characteristics of the individual (age, household size), 
socio-economic status (consumption quintile, education, land cultivated), experience of any type of shock in the 12 
months preceding the survey, and variables capturing financial participation and networks. We also estimated 
specifications that excluded consumption and included three time-varying health status variables. The estimates are 
robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the consumption and health status variables.  
 
12 As shown in Table A1, the sample is divided into three sets of woredas- those which have only the CBHI, those 
with only the PSNP and those where both the CBHI and the PSNP offer. We allow woreda-specific time effects for 
each of these three types of woredas. 
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 While it is straightforward to estimate equation (1), there are a number of potential 
identification concerns that require discussion. As mentioned in section 2, participation in the 
PSNP is not voluntary and households cannot self-select themselves into the scheme. 
Beneficiaries are selected on the basis of community identification of their food-insecure status 
as well as an assessment of their assets and employment status. While this does not preclude the 
possibility that unobserved factors such as local influence and social networks may influence 
beneficiary selection, unless such factors are changing over time it is perhaps reasonable to argue 
that equation (1) which controls for time-varying socio-economic characteristics and individual 
fixed-effects is likely to be able to deal with endogeneity of PSNP participation.  
A perhaps more challenging issue is the endogeneity of CBHI membership. As described 
in section 2, households choose whether to join the CBHI and it is possible that CBHI 
membership is driven by unobserved characteristics that are systematically associated with the 
outcomes, and thereby confound scheme effects. For example, health status may influence the 
demand for health care as well as the demand for health insurance, or, if health status declines 
over time this may influence CBHI uptake and lead to increased use of health care which may 
not be attributable to CBHI membership. While equation (1) includes individual fixed effects 
and controls for time-varying observed socio-economic attributes and in some cases time-
varying measures of health status and whether households have experienced shocks, it is still 
possible that unobserved time-varying factors that influence the outcomes of interest also drive 
CBHI uptake.13 Keeping in mind the potential selection issues, prior to discussing estimates of 
equation (1), we explore differences between CBHI participants and non-participants and also 
examine what drives scheme uptake.   
5. Results  
5.1 PSNP and CBHI - Uptake  
                                                     
13 We include three time-varying measures of health status and experience of any type of shock (health, natural, 
economic, social, institutional, market or other) in the twelve months preceding the survey. 
13 
 
In 2011, before the launch of the CBHI, about 21 percent of the sample respondents were 
enrolled in the PSNP. The figure increased slightly in 2012 (22 percent) but fell to 18 percent in 
2013. While the aggregate PSNP enrolment figures do not seem to exhibit much variation over 
time, this is misleading, as over the three years it is not the same individuals who remain in the 
scheme.  Within a year of its launch, CBHI enrolment reached 43 percent and in 2013, rose to 51 
percent (Table 1). PSNP beneficiaries are far more likely to participate in the CBHI scheme. For 
instance, in 2012 about 65 percent of PSNP beneficiaries enrolled in the scheme as compared to 
an enrolment rate of 38 percent amongst non-beneficiaries while in 2013 the corresponding 
figures were 72 and 46 percent (Table 2). By 2013, 52 percent of sample was not enrolled in 
either of the two schemes, 30 percent were enrolled only in the CBHI, 9 percent in both 
schemes and 8 percent only in the PSNP (Table 3).   
5.2 Who enrols in the PSNP and the CBHI? 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for a range of socio-economic, demographic and health 
status variables conditional on PSNP membership, while Table 5 contains estimates from a logit 
model of the probability of participating in the PSNP. These statistics are for 2011, that is, 
before the launch of the CBHI. Consistent with the PSNP’s focus on food insecure households, 
the descriptive statistics show that 33 percent of PSNP members are in the lowest consumption 
quintile as compared to 20 percent of non-members. PSNP members are more likely to be 
uneducated (44 versus 38 percent) and own less land (0.78 versus 1.2 hectares).  PSNP members 
are also less likely to be embedded in formal and informal financial networks. In contrast to the 
sharp differences in socio-economic status, differences in health status across membership status 
is muted. None of the three health status variables are statistically different across PSNP 
membership.  
The regression estimates echo the patterns discussed above with individuals in the richest 
consumption quintile 9 percentage points less likely to join the scheme and a higher probability 
of membership for those with lower land holdings. With regard to health status, individuals with 
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good self-rated health status are 4.5 percentage points more likely to be PSNP members while 
the other health status indicators have no bearing on PSNP membership. Overall, the descriptive 
statistics and the regression estimates support the argument that PSNP membership is driven by 
socio-economic status and it is not that those with weaker health status are more likely to join 
the PSNP.  
Turning to the CBHI, Table 6 provides descriptive statistics at baseline conditional on 
insurance status in 2012 while Table 7 contains logit estimates for the probability of enrolling in 
the CBHI in 2013 and 2012 as a function of characteristics in the preceding year. Based on the 
descriptive statistics, the link between socio-economic status and enrolment status is not 
straightforward. While land size and access to participation in financial networks are positively 
associated with enrolment, the effect of consumption on enrolment seems to be non-linear, with 
individuals belonging to the poorest and the richest quintiles more likely to join the scheme. As 
shown in Table 2, participation in the PSNP is linked to higher CBHI enrolment rates. Perhaps 
contrary to expectations, the health status variables indicate that those with good self-assessed 
heath status and a lower incidence of chronic disease are more likely to enrol in the scheme. 
Logit estimates of the probability of enrolling in the CBHI scheme paint a similar picture. That 
is, individuals belonging to the richest consumption quintile, with larger land holdings and 
greater participation in financial networks are more likely to enrol in the scheme but at the same 
time individuals from the weakest socio-economic category (PSNP members) and from the 
lowest consumption quintile are more likely to join the scheme as compared to those in quintiles 
2, 3 and 4. With regard to health status, there is no evidence that individuals with poorer health 
status – either self-assessed or based on the incidence of recent illness or the prevalence of 
chronic conditions are more likely to join the scheme. If anything, the estimates indicate that 
those with better self-assessed health status and a lower incidence of illness are more likely to 
join the scheme.  
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The profiles of the PSNP and CBHI members and the role of the PSNP in influencing 
CBHI enrolment suggests that individuals belonging to both the PSNP and the CBHI are likely 
to belong to the weakest socio-economic category. This is clearly visible in Table 8 which shows 
that 46 percent of the individuals who are in both the programs belong to the poorest 
consumption quintile as compared to 20 percent amongst those in no program. There is a clear 
hierarchy in terms of socio-economic status with individuals belonging only to the CBHI at the 
top rung, followed by those who are not members of either program, PSNP members and finally 
those who participate in both schemes. This clear-cut pattern based on socio-economic status is 
in sharp contrast to health status. Across the four categories, there are small differences in the 
three health status variables.  Multinomial logit estimates of the probability of being in the four 
categories (Table 9) yields the same message. Individuals in the highest consumption quintile are 
about 6 percentage points less likely to belong to both programs and 9 percentage points more 
likely to enrol in the CBHI. Similarly, households with larger land endowments are 4 percentage 
points less likely to belong to both programs and 6 percentage points more likely to enrol in the 
CBHI.  With regard to health status, past illness has no bearing on program status, the incidence 
of chronic illness reduces the probability of being in both programs by 3 percentage points and 
has no bearing on determining entry into the CBHI. If anything those with better self-assessed 
health status are more likely to join both programs and self-assessed health status does not 
influence insurance uptake.   
With regard to the outcomes, at baseline, consistent with the consumption data and land-
ownership patterns, those belonging to both programs have substantially lower livestock 
holdings and are far more likely to be engaged in off-farm work (see Table 8). At baseline, their 
utilization of health care is lower as compared to those who do not belong to both programs or 
those who eventually participate only in the CBHI. The clear picture emerging from this section 
is that selection into the four different states is strongly linked to socio-economic status and not 
to health status. Furthermore, the substantially lower socio-economic status and lower health 
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care use, at baseline, for those who belong to both programs, suggests negative selection into this 
category and supports the idea that, if at all, estimates of the effect of belonging to both social 
programs are likely to be downward biased.       
5.3 The joint effect of CBHI and PSNP  
Estimates of the joint and individual effect of the two programs on health care 
utilization, labor supply, livestock and borrowings is provided in Tables 11a and 11b. We begin 
with a discussion of the effect of the two schemes on health care use. Participating in the CBHI 
increases the probability of using outpatient health care by 2.3 percentage points or 26 percent 
compared to those who don’t participate in either program. In contrast, PSNP membership on 
its own does not have a statistically significant effect on health care use. However, the additional 
effect of belonging to both programs is 4.6 percentage points or a 5.2 percentage point increase 
in the use of health care for those who belong to both programs as compared to those who 
belong to neither. Compared to non-participants this is a 58 percent increase in the probability 
of using health care. Joint membership also has a positive effect on the frequency of using 
modern health care, although the effect is not precise.  While the estimates in Table 11a focus 
only on adults, we also estimated the effect of participation in the two schemes on other 
household members, that is, young children (less than 15) and older adults (65 and above) and 
for the full sample (see Table A5). These estimates confirm the finding that joint membership 
increases both the probability of using health care and the frequency of use. Thus, not only does 
participating in the PSNP translate into greater enrolment in the CBHI (Tables 2 and 7) it also 
translates into greater use of health care amongst those belonging to both programs.  
As discussed in Section 4, government officials use the PSNP as a platform to encourage 
greater uptake of CBHI not only to fulfil enrolment targets but also to mitigate the effect of 
health-related reasons for not providing PSNP labor contributions. If this is valid then 
participation in both programs may be expected to translate not only into greater health care use 
but also into greater off-farm labor supply. As shown in Table 11a, participating in the PSNP 
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increases the probability of providing off-farm work by 13 percentage points. Given the nature 
of the PSNP, which requires off-farm work in order to obtain benefits this may be expected. In 
contrast, on its own CBHI membership has no effect on labor supply. However, PSNP 
members who are also members of the CBHI are 7 percentage points more likely to work in off-
farm activities. Thus, as compared to individuals who do not participate in either of the two 
programs, participating in both the programs increases the probability of engaging in off-farm 
work by 21 percentage points (Table 11b). The large, positive and statistically significant effect of 
joint membership is also evident in terms of hours of off-farm labor supply. An individual 
participating only in the PSNP provides an additional 6 hours of work as compared to those who 
do not participate in any program while individuals belonging to both programs provide 16 more 
hours per month to off-farm activities as compared to those who do not participate in either of 
the two programs. While we are unable to determine whether the additional off-farm labor 
supply is directed to the PSNP, the increase in health care use and the increase in off-farm labor 
supply is consistent with the claim of government officials and the view of participants who are 
members of both programs (see Section 4) that the CBHI helps individuals access health care in 
a timely manner and thereby reduces health-related absenteeism in the PSNP.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
On their own the two social programs do not have the capability of helping households 
build assets. Both CBHI and the PSNP on their own have no impact on the value of livestock 
assets (Table 11a). This is consistent with the findings on the effect of the CBHI on livestock 
assets as reported in Yilma et al. (2015) and the effect of the PSNP, also on livestock assets in 
Andersson et al. (2011).14 In contrast, belonging to both social programs is associated with a 717 
Birr increase in the value of livestock or a modest increase of about 4 percent as compared to 
those who don’t belong to either program. With regard to the incidence of borrowing, the effect 
emanates almost entirely from CBHI membership. PSNP on its own does not influence the 
                                                     
14 In contrast to the finding reported in Andersson et al. (2011), Berhane et al. (2011) find that five years of 
participation in the public works programs raises livestock holdings by 0.38 tropical livestock units (TLU) relative to 
those who have participated for only one year. The effect is statistically significant. 
18 
 
probability of borrowing and the joint effect is zero. In contrast, conditional on borrowing, while 
CBHI membership encourages greater borrowing, membership of both programs works towards 
reducing the debt burden of households. Belonging to both programs is associated with a 616 
Birr or 27 percent reduction in debt.15  
5.4 Robustness checks 
As has been shown in Table 8, at baseline, there are clear differences in the socio-economic 
status of those who are enrolled in both schemes versus those who are not enrolled in either 
scheme or enrolled only in the CBHI.  While our estimates do control for individual fixed-effects 
and time-varying traits, it is still possible that pre-existing unobservable differences at baseline 
may influence the trajectory of the outcome variables in subsequent years and contaminate the 
effects of the CBHI and the PSNP.  This section reports on two robustness checks carried out 
to probe the sensitivity of the estimates. 
In an attempt to examine the effects of working with groups that are very different at 
baseline, we re-estimated the specifications reported in Table 11a based only on those who 
participate in the PSNP.  As maybe seen in Table 8, at baseline, those who participate only in the 
PSNP have similar traits as compared to those who participate in both programs. Statistically, at 
baseline, at least at the 10% level, there is no difference in the outcome variables between these 
two groups.16 While not as crisp as those reported in Table 11a, estimates conditioning on PSNP 
status (see Table A6) reveal a similar pattern. That is, PSNP participants who are enrolled in the 
CBHI are 4 percentage points more likely to use health care and 10 percentage points more likely 
to engage in off-farm labor. Their labour contributions in terms of hours of work are 31% 
                                                     
15 We also estimated household level regressions of livestock and borrowing (see Table A8). The effect of joint 
membership on livestock is positive but statistically insignificant while the effect on the amount of borrowing 
remains in the same range as reported earlier.  
 
16 A joint test for differences in means of the six outcome variables (excluding loan amount as the number of 
observations differs) yields a p-value of 0.099. Individually, except for the probability of taking a loan, differences in 
means for all outcomes variables is statistically insignificant.  
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higher than their non-CBHI enrolled counterparts. While there is no effect on livestock assets, 
their participation in the CBHI is associated with an 18% reduction in borrowing. 
 The CBHI scheme is meant to enhance access to health care only from public health 
centers and hospitals as opposed to publicly provided health posts (which provide free access) 
and privately run health centers. If we are picking up spurious effects then it is possible that joint 
participation in the CBHI and PSNP will also have an effect on health care utilization from 
health posts and from privately run clinics. Estimates provided in Table A7 show that the effect 
we are identifying emanates entirely from an increase in health care utilization from publicly 
provided health care and specifically from publicly run health centers as opposed to health posts 
and privately provided care. 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and the Community Based Health Insurance 
(CBHI) are two large social protection interventions in Ethiopia. Motivated, in part, by policy 
declarations which urge greater coordination between social protection interventions and the 
potential offered by the two programs in jointly dealing with the multiple shocks faced by rural 
Ethiopian households, this paper examined the effect of participating in both the CBHI and the 
PSNP on health care utilization, off-farm labor supply, livestock assets and borrowing.    
The analysis was based on three rounds of panel data and informed by several rounds of 
qualitative work. We exploited the panel data, baseline and two follow-up surveys at least with 
respect to the CBHI, controlled for individual and time fixed-effects as well as a range of time-
varying traits to provide arguably credible estimates. We found that individuals covered by both 
programs were 5 percentage points more likely to use outpatient care and 21 percentage points 
more likely to participate in off-farm work. Participation in both programs was associated with a 
5 percent increase in livestock and a 27 percent decline in debt. The estimates were insensitive to 
a number of robustness checks. Despite this, given the targeted nature of the PSNP and 
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voluntary enrolment into the CBHI we don’t pretend to offer causal effects, but estimates that 
are reasonably well-identified.  
Our results display that at least in Ethiopia not only may participation in the PSNP be 
used to leverage greater uptake of health insurance but that co-ordinating the efforts of safety net 
transfers and health related interventions is well-founded and affords greater protection to 
vulnerable households. Unlike Winston Smith in Orwell’s 1984 who worries whether a strong 
state will assert that “two plus two equals five”, in the current case it does seem that the 
combination of the two programs delivers more than the sum of the individual effects.   
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Table 1 
 Participation in PSNP and CBHI 
 
Program 
2011 2012 2013 
Membership Membership Membership 
 % N %  N % N 
PSNP 21.2 918 21.8       940 17.6      732 
CBHI 0 0 43.2     1,445 50.6    1,640 
 
 
 
Table 2 
CBHI uptake and PSNP participation  
Enrolled in 
the CBHI 
2012 2013 
PSNP 
member 
Non-
members 
Total PSNP 
member 
Non-
member 
Total 
Enrolled  410 
(64.6) 
1,035 
(38.2) 
1,445 
(43.2) 
380  
(72.2) 
1,260 
(46.4) 
1640 
(50.6) 
Total 635 2,707 3,342 526 2,715 3241 
Notes: Observations are restricted to the districts where CBHI was offered. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Participation in CBHI and PSNP – Full Sample 
 
Program 
2011 2012 2013 Sample total 
Membership Membership Membership Membership 
 % N %  N % N % 
PSNP only 21.2 918 12.2            530 8.5             352 14.0       1,800 
CBHI only - - 23.9         1,035 30.4          1,260 17.9        2,295 
Both programs                  - - 9.4           410 9.2             380 6.2          790 
No program 78.8 3,414 54.5         2,362 52.0          2,159 61.9       7,935 
Total  4,332                  4,337                  4,151                12,820 
Notes: Observations include districts where CBHI was not offered. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics conditional on PSNP status in 2011 
 PSNP Membership  Total 
Variable Member Non-member p-
value Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Socioeconomic status        
Poorest consumption quintile 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.23 0.42 
2nd consumption quintile 0.27 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.22 0.41 
3rd consumption quintile 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.04 0.19 0.39 
4th consumption quintile 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.19 0.40 
Richest consumption quintile 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.17 0.38 
Education- No education  0.43 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.01 0.39 0.49 
Education- Informal  0.05 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.25 
Education- Primary 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.11 0.42 0.49 
Education-Secondary and above 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.58 0.12 0.32 
    Land cultivated  0.78 0.56 1.18 0.97 0.00 1.09 0.91 
    Experienced shock  0.86 0.35 0.89 0.32 0.02 0.88 0.32 
Demographic traits        
Age  32.8 13.4 32.2 12.9 0.20 32.3 13.0 
Male 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.09 0.51 0.50 
Household size 6.2 2.1 6.6 2.2 0.00 6.5 2.2 
    Religion-Orthodox 0.62 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.49 0.50 
    Religion-Protestant 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.22 0.41 
    Religion-Muslim 0.19 0.40 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.26 0.44 
    Religion- Other religion or no religion 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.58 0.03 0.16 
Health status        
Self-assessed health - good 0.81 0.39 0.80 0.40 0.21 0.80 0.40 
Self-assessed health - not good 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.40 
Past illness event  1.8 6.8 1.9 6.9 0.67 1.8 6.9 
Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.84 0.06 0.24 
Financial participation and networks         
Savings in bank account 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.13 0.34 
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/credit group 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.07 0.25 
Member of a formal credit & saving association 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.11 0.32 
    Official position held 0.20 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.25 0.44 
Regions        
   Tigray 0.61 0.49 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.41 
Amhara 0.14 0.34 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.27 0.44 
Oromia 0.06 0.23 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.24 0.43 
SNNPR 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.28 0.45 
Observations 918 3,414  4,332 
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Table 5 
Probability of enrolling in the PSNP in 2011 - marginal effects after logit (std. error) 
Variables 2011 
Socioeconomic status  
2nd consumption quintile (Ref.: Poorest Quintile) -0.021** 
 (0.009) 
3rd consumption quintile -0.055*** 
 (0.005) 
4th consumption quintile -0.063*** 
 (0.005) 
Richest consumption quintile -0.089*** 
 (0.006) 
Education- Primary (Ref.: No & Informal Education) -0.007 
 (0.011) 
Education- Secondary and above 0.014 
 (0.015) 
    Land Cultivated  -0.053*** 
 (0.005) 
    Experienced Shock  -0.027*** 
 (0.004) 
Demographic Traits  
Age 0.0004 
 (0.0003) 
Male -0.004 
 (0.015) 
Household size -0.007*** 
 (0.001) 
Religion - Orthodox (Ref: Muslim) -0.239*** 
 (0.006) 
Religion – Protestant -0.015 
 (0.028) 
Religion-Other religion or no religion 0.006 
 (0.025) 
Health status  
Self-assessed health – good (ref: SAH- not good) 
 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Past illness event 0.0004 
 (0.0005) 
Chronic illness 0.009 
 (0.015) 
Financial participation and networks   
Saving in bank account  -0.005 
 (0.006) 
Member of Iqqub -0.041*** 
 (0.007) 
Member of credit and saving association  0.034** 
 (0.017) 
    Official position held 0.025*** 
 (0.007) 
Observations 4,275 
Pseudo R-squared 0.315 
Log pseudo likelihood -1511.95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The specification also includes regional fixed 
effects.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics conditional on CBHI membership status  
 CBHI Enrolment  Total 
Variable Enrolled Not-enrolled p-value 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Socioeconomic status        
Poorest consumption quintile 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.01 0.23 0.42 
2nd consumption quintile 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.41 
3rd consumption quintile 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.21 0.41 
4th consumption quintile 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.40 
Richest consumption quintile 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.15 0.36 
    Participation in PSNP 0.25 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.18 0.38 
Education- No education  0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.07 0.38 0.48 
Education- Informal  0.08 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.06 0.25 
Education- Primary 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.88 0.43 0.50 
Education-Secondary and above 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.93 0.13 0.33 
    Land cultivated  1.3 1.2 1.1 0.83 0.00 1.2 0.99 
    Experienced shock  0.83 0.37 0.91 0.29 0.00 0.88 0.33 
Demographic traits        
Age  32.2 13.2 32.1 13.1 0.80 32.2 13.1 
Male  0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.67 0.52 0.50 
Household size 6.8 2.2 6.4 2.2 0.00 6.6 2.2 
    Religion-Orthodox 0.60 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.01 0.57 0.50 
    Religion-Protestant 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.23 0.42 
    Religion-Muslim 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.13 0.18 0.38 
    Religion-Other religion of no religion 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.15 
Health status        
Self-assessed health – good 0.81 0.39 0.76 0.43 0.00 0.78 0.42 
Self-assessed health - not good 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.22 0.42 
Past illness event  1.8 6.9 1.9 6.7 0.55 1.9 6.8 
Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.26 0.01 0.07 0.26 
Financial participation and networks         
Savings in bank account 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.15 0.36 
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/credit group 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.08 0.27 
Member of a formal credit & saving association 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.14 0.35 
    Official position held 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.26 0.44 
Regions        
Tigray 0.18 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.21 0.40 
Amhara 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.26 0.44 
Oromia 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.24 0.43 
SNNPR 0.24 0.43 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.29 0.46 
Observations 1,405 1,879  3,284 
Notes: CBHI enrolment in 2012 and all characteristics based on the 2011 survey. 
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Table 7 
  Probability of enrolling in the CBHI - marginal effects after logit (std. error) 
Variables  2013 2012 
Socioeconomic status     
    2nd Consumption Quintile (Ref: Poorest Quintile) -0.203*** -0.200*** -0.087*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)    
   3rd Consumption Quintile -0.082*** -0.053*** -0.111*** -0.084*** 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)    
   4th Consumption Quintile -0.009 0.025* -0.124*** -0.088*** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)    
   5th Consumption Quintile -0.018 0.019 -0.001 0.051*** 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019)    
   Participation in PSNP 
 
0.322***  0.432*** 
  
(0.007)  (0.016)    
   Informal Education (Ref: No Education) 0.072 0.064 0.057*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.047) (0.051) (0.022) (0.020)    
   Primary Education 0.047*** 0.042** 0.013 0.019    
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015)    
   Secondary & above Education 0.078** 0.081* 0.007 -0.004    
 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.029) (0.028)    
   Land Cultivated  0.085*** 0.113*** 0.033*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)    
   Experienced Shock  -0.106*** -0.068*** -0.160*** -0.133*** 
 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.021) (0.018)    
Demographic characteristics     
   Age 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0002    
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0008)    
  Male -0.044** -0.040** -0.011 -0.008   
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)    
   Household Size 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)    
   Religion-Orthodox (Ref.: Muslim) -0.074*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.018    
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016)    
   Religion-Protestant -0.132*** -0.130*** 0.009 0.007   
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.0290) (0.027)    
   Religion: Other religion or no religion -0.372*** -0.376*** -0.151*** -0.181*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.036)    
Health status  
  
  
   Self-assessed health – good (Ref.: SAH- not good) 0.102*** 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.013)    
   Past illness 0.003** 0.002 0.003 0.002  
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.00170) (0.002)    
   Chronic illness 0.015 0.034 -0.072*** -0.065**  
 
(0.010) (0.114) (0.027) (0.029)    
Financial participation and networks  
  
  
  Saving in bank account  0.107*** 0.113*** -0.066*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)    
  Member of Iqqub 0.001 0.005 -0.035 -0.002 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.024) (0.023)    
  Member of credit and saving association  0.013 -0.003 0.124*** 0.112*** 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.007) (0.011)    
 Official position held 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)    
Observations 3218 3212 3266 3239 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154 0.184 0.056 0.104    
Log pseudo likelihood -1887.532 -1816.722 -2102.200 -1981.740 
Notes: All explanatory variables are at their 2012/2011 values; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, *p<0.1. The specification also includes a set of regional fixed effects. The specification for 2013 additionally 
control for understanding of health insurance and knowledge and involvement in the CBHI. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics conditional on membership status  
Variables  
Total 
Sample 
 
(1) 
CBHI* 
PSNP  
 
(2) 
CBHI  
 
 
(3) 
PSNP  
 
 
(4) 
No 
Program  
 
(5) 
p-value 
 
  
(6) 
Outcome variables       
   Utilization of modern health care (1/0) 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.04 
   Number of visits to modern health facilities 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.16 
   Off-farm worker (1/0) 0.13 0.29 0.1 0.31 0.09 0.00 
   Number of hours worked off-farm (in a month)  11.02 22.4 7.7 23.0 7.7 0.00 
   Value of Livestock (Birr)  19963.74 13031.1 29897.0 12815.6 17585.27 0.00 
   Loan uptake (1/0)  0.32 0.50 0.34 0.41 0.27 0.00 
   Amout of loan (Birr)  2186.23 2052.73 2340.87 2485.57 2040.97 0.94 
Covariates       
 Socioeconomic status       
   Poorest consumption quintile 0.23 0.46 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.00 
   2nd consumption quintile 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.04 
   3rd consumption quintile 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.00 
   4th consumption quintile 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.00 
   Richest consumption quintile 0.17 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.00 
   No education 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.98 
   Informal education 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.14 
   Primary education 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.96 
   Secondary education and above 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.33 
   Land cultivated  1.1 0.69 1.6 0.79 1.0 0.00 
   Experienced shock  0.88 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.00 
Demographic characteristics       
   Age 32.3 32.6 32.1 32.5 32.2 0.59 
   Male 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.47 0.52 0.14 
   Household size 6.5 6.7 6.9 5.9 6.4 0.06 
   Religion- Orthodox 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.00 
   Religion- Protestant 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.25 0.14 
   Religion – Muslim 0.27 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.00 
   Religion- other religion or no religion 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.96 
Health status       
   Self-assessed health-good 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.06 
   Self-assessed health-not good 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.06 
   Past illness event  1.8 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.31 
   Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02 
Financial participation and networks       
Savings in bank account 0.13 0.03 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.00 
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/credit 
group 
0.07 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.86 
Member of a formal credit & saving association 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.02 0.10 0.68 
    Official position held 0.25 0.13 0.38 0.19 0.23 0.00 
Regions       
    Tigray 0.21 0.48 0.07 0.61 0.13 0.00 
    Amhara 0.26 0.07 0.39 0.17 0.26 0.00 
    Oromia 0.25 0.07 0.35 0.07 0.27 0.00 
    SNNPR 0.28 0.37 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.12 
Observations (N) 4,259 390 1,011 512 2,346 
 Notes: CBHI and PSNP membership status in 2012 values. All other characteristics are based on the 2011 survey. 
P-value for comparison of means in columns 2 and 5. 
  
31 
 
Table 9 
Probability of participating in PSNP and CBHI- Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects Estimates 
(std. error) 
Variables  No program CBHI only PSNP only  Both programs 
Socioeconomic status     
    2nd Consumption Quintile (Ref: Poorest Quintile) 0.058*** -0.024** -0.012** -0.022*** 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)    
   3rd Consumption Quintile 0.036*** 0.031*** -0.031*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)    
   4th Consumption Quintile 0.030*** 0.023** -0.019*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005)    
   5th Consumption Quintile 0.020** 0.089*** -0.046*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)    
   Informal Education (Ref: No Education) -0.057** 0.037** 0.014*** 0.006    
 
(0.027) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013)    
   Primary Education -0.035*** 0.018 0.007 0.009    
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)    
   Secondary & above Education -0.021 0.007 -0.003 0.017    
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012)    
   Land Cultivated  -0.004 0.061*** -0.022*** -0.036*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)    
   Experienced Shock  0.067*** -0.024** -0.005 -0.037*** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003)    
Demographic characteristics     
   Age -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.00001 0.0006  
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)    
  Male 0.016 0.0007 -0.006 -0.011*   
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)    
   Household Size -0.011*** 0.020*** -0.007*** -0.002*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0008)    
   Religion-Orthodox (Ref. category: Muslim) 0.010 0.198*** -0.170*** -0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.005)    
   Religion-Protestant -0.142*** 0.189*** -0.020** -0.027*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.008) (0.006)    
   Religion- Other religion or no religion 0.111** -0.119** 0.021 -0.013    
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.016) (0.013)    
Health status   
 
  
   Self-assessed health –good (Reference not good SAH) -0.048*** 0.016 0.014*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002)    
   Past illness -0.002* 0.001 0.0003 0.0004   
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0005)    
   Chronic illness 0.016 0.001 0.009 -0.026*** 
 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.012) (0.0032)    
Financial participation and networks   
 
  
  Saving in bank account  0.002 0.049*** -0.006 -0.045*** 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)    
  Member of Iqqub -0.009 -0.034** 0.031*** 0.012**  
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)    
  Member of credit and saving association  -0.053*** 0.024 -0.037*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011)    
 Official position held -0.049*** 0.063*** -0.006** -0.008*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003)    
Observations 4,214 4,214 4,214 4,214 
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.193 0.193 0.193 
Log pseudo likelihood -3895.630 -3895.630 -3895.630 -3895.630 
Notes: All explanatory variables are at their 2011 values; Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive statistics by membership status – Full sample 
Variables  
Total 
Sample 
 
(1) 
CBHI* 
PSNP  
 
(2) 
CBHI  
 
 
(3) 
PSNP  
 
 
(4) 
No 
Program  
 
(5) 
p-
value 
 
 (6) 
Outcome variables       
   Utilization of modern health care  
   (1/0) 
0.09 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 
   Number of visits to modern health care    facilities 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.62 
   Off-farm worker (1/0) 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.00 
   Number of hours worked off-farm (in a month)  11.50 30.0 6.6 25.69 7.8 0.00 
   Value of Livestock Assets (Birr)  19375.3 13560.6 27765.0 12703.6 19041.1 0.00 
   Loan uptake (1/0)  0.30 0.41 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.00 
   Amout of loan (Birr)  2499.16 2468.38 3314.12 2392.75 2307.13 0.19 
Covariates       
Socioeconomic status       
   Poorest consumption quintile 0.22 0.35 0.16 0.30 0.21 0.00 
   2nd consumption quintile 0.22 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.01 
   3rd consumption quintile 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.37 
   4th consumption quintile 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.00 
   Richest consumption quintile 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.19 0.00 
   No education 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.43 0.39 0.09 
   Informal education 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.00 
   Primary education 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.15 
   Secondary education and above 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.02 
   Land cultivated  1.06 0.64 1.5 0.74 1.05 0.00 
   Experienced shock  0.77 0.59 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.00 
Demographic characteristics       
   Age 32.6 32.7 32.8 33.1 32.5 0.71 
   Male 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.01 
   Household size 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.0 6.5 0.05 
   Religion- Orthodox 0.49 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.41 0.00 
   Religion- Protestant 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.15 
   Religion - Muslim 0.26 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.00 
   Religion- other relgion or no religion 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Health status       
   Self-assessed health - good 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.00 
   Self-assessed health - not good 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.00 
   Past illness event  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.80 
   Chronic illness for more than 30 days 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.51 
Financial participation and networks       
Savings in bank account 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.63 
Member of Iqqub – informal rotating savings/credit 
group 
0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.56 
Member of a formal credit & saving association 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.78 
    Official position held 0.23 0.16 0.35 0.17 0.22 0.00 
Regions       
   Tigray 0.21 0.49 0.13 0.60 0.12 0.00 
   Amhara 0.26 0.07 0.40 0.14 0.27 0.00 
   Oromia 0.24 0.07 0.29 0.07 0.28 0.00 
   SNNPR 0.29 0.37 0.18 0.19 0.33 0.05 
Observations (N) 12,820 790 2,295 1,800 7,935 
 Notes: The p-value is for differences in means between columns 2 and 5  
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Table 11a 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on health care utilization, off-farm labour supply and asset accumulation 
 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Number of visits 
to modern health 
facility 
Participation in off-
farm work (1/0) 
Number of hours 
worked off-farm 
Value of livestock 
assets (Birr) Loan uptake (1/0) 
Outstanding 
loan (Birr) 
CBHI*PSNP 0.046** 0.037 0.067*** 10.90*** 886.4** -0.013    -1280.0*** 
 (0.019) (0.039)    (0.024)    (2.80)    (422.7)    (0.031)    (226.8)    
CBHI 0.023* 0.071***  0.008    -0.57  -176.2    -0.033** 619.3*** 
 (0.012) (0.024)    (0.010)    (1.34)    (313.8)    (0.016)    (134.2)    
PSNP -0.017 -0.034 0.130*** 6.12*** 7.16    -0.012 45.18    
 (0.013) (0.025)    (0.019)    (2.20)    (399.4)    (0.023)    (238.0)    
N 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 3,840 
Adj. R-sq 0.012 0.014 0.031 0.023 0.049 0.043 0.176 
Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, 
education, crop land ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial 
institution. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
Table 11b 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on health care utilization, off-farm labour supply and asset accumulation 
 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Number of visits 
to modern health 
facility 
Participation in Off-
Farm Work (1/0) 
Number of Hours 
worked in Off-Farm 
Value of Livestock 
Assets (Birr) Loan Uptake (1/0) 
Outstanding Loan 
(Birr) 
Joint effect vs. No program 0.052*** 0.073**    0.205*** 16.45*** 717.38* -0.057* -615.57** 
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.025) (2.82) (432.93) (0.031) (281.56) 
Joint effect vs. only CBHI 0.029 0.003 0.197*** 17.02*** 893.53* -0.025 -1234.85*** 
 (0.020) (0.041) (0.026) (2.98) (465.23) (0.032) (291.75) 
Joint effect vs. only PSNP 0.069*** 0.108*** 0.075*** 10.32*** 710.22* -0.046 -660.75*** 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.023) (2.64) (381.75) (0.029) (187.42) 
N 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 3,840 
Adj. R-sq 0.012 0.014 0.031 0.023 0.049 0.043 0.176 
Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, 
education, crop land ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial 
institution. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
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Table A1 
 District level intersection of CBHI and PSNP  
 
 
Region 
Amhara Oromia SNNPR Tigray 
PSNP = 1 
CBHI = 1 
 
PSNP = 1 
CBHI = 0 
 
Tehuledere Deder Dale  Kelite Awlalo 
Kuyu Denboya Ahferon 
 
 
Qallu  
 
 
Kersa 
Damot Woyde Tahitay Adiabo 
 
Awasa Zurya Saesy Tseadamba 
PSNP = 0 
CBHI = 1 
Fogera Gimbichu - - 
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Table A2 
Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Outcome variables  
Modern health care utilization Visited a modern health care facility for outpatient healthcare (OHC) in the 
two months preceding the survey  
Number of visits to modern health 
facility 
Number of times a modern health care facility is visited for OHC in the two 
months preceding the survey. 
Participation in off-farm activities  Engaged in off-farm work in the four weeks preceding the survey  
Number of hours worked off-farm Number of hours of off-farm work in the four weeks preceding the survey   
Value of Livestock Assets  Value of livestock assets owned by the household, in Birr. Livestock includes, 
the number of oxen, bulls, cows, horses, donkeys, mules, camels, goats, sheep and 
chicken; we use median prices for each type of livestock based on a price survey 
conducted in 2014 (Biggeri et al. 2015)  
Loan Currently household has an outstanding loan  
Amount of Loan  Amount of the outstanding loan in Birr 
Explanatory Variables  
Socioeconomic status  
CBHI*PSNP Enrolled in the CBHI and the PSNP  
CBHI Enrolled in the CBHI 
PSNP Enrolled in the PSNP 
Consumption quintiles Classification of individuals based on monthly consumption expenditure (in 
Birr) excluding health care spending (poorest (1st) quintile), 2nd quintile, 3rd 
quintile, 4th quintile, richest (5th) quintile) 
Education Education level of an individual (no education, informal education, primary 
education, secondary and above education) 
Land cultivated  Size of land cultivated in hectares  
Household shock experience Experience of any type of shock (health, natural, economic, social, 
institutional, market or other) in the twelve months preceding the survey. 
Demographic traits  
Age Age in complete years 
Male Male  
Household size Number of household members  
Health status   
SAH-good Self-assessed health is rated as good (includes very good and excellent)  
SAH- not good Self-assessed health is rated as not good (includes average) 
Past illness event Total number of days ill in the two months preceding the survey 
Chronic Illness Disease symptoms have persisted for more than 30 days 
Financial participation and 
networks  
 
Savings in bank account At least one member of the household has savings in bank account  
Member of iqqub At least one member of the household participates in iqqub 
Member of credit & saving 
association 
At least one member of the household participates in credit and saving 
association  
Official position held At least one member of the household held or still holds official (kebele or 
traditional) position. 
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Table A3 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on health care utilization and off-farm labour supply 
Variables Modern healthcare 
utilization (1/0) 
 
Number of visits 
to modern health 
facility 
Participation in 
Off-Farm Work 
(1/0) 
Number of 
Hours worked 
in Off-Farm 
Socioeconomic status     
   CBHI*PSNP 0.046** 0.037 0.067*** 10.90*** 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.024) (2.80) 
   CBHI 0.023* 0.071*** 0.008 -0.57    
 (0.012) (0.0242) (0.010) (1.34) 
   PSNP -0.017 -0.034 0.130*** 6.12*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.019) (2.20) 
   2nd Consumption Quintile (Ref: 1st Quintile) 0.005 0.006 -0.001 1.67 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) (1.27) 
   3rd Consumption Quintile 0.011 0.029 0.002 1.30 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (1.23) 
   4th Consumption Quintile 0.015 0.029 -0.001 1.86 
 (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (1.37) 
   5th Consumption Quintile 0.018 0.057** -0.001 2.42 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (1.49) 
   Informal Education (Ref: No Education) 0.025 0.030 0.009 3.34*   
 (0.018) (0.036) (0.015) (1.89) 
   Primary Education 0.011 0.043 0.018 1.13 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.015) (1.74) 
   Secondary & above Education 0.013 0.051 0.032 3.47 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.021) (2.69) 
Demographic characteristics     
   Household size 0.004 0.014 -0.004 -0.62    
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.52)    
   Land cultivated -0.013** -0.021* -0.001 -0.16   
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.58)    
   Experienced shock 0.048*** 0.087*** 0.022*** 0.89    
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (1.03) 
Financial participation and networks     
   Saving in bank account 0.003 0.003 0.020* 1.30 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (1.40) 
   Member of Iqqub -0.007 -0.030 -0.011 -3.66*   
 (0.016) (0.033) (0.017) (2.02) 
   Member of credit & saving association  0.024 0.011 0.019 3.48**  
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.012) (1.71) 
   Official position held 0.017 0.018 0.006 1.03 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (1.04) 
N 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 
Adj. R-sq 0.012 0.014 0.031 0.023 
Notes: Full estimates from specifications for Columns 2-5 of Tables 11a and 11b. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
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Table A4 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on asset accumulation  
Variables Value of Livestock 
Assets (Birr) Loan Uptake (1/0) 
Amount of 
Loan (Birr) 
Socioeconomic status    
   CBHI*PSNP 886.4** -0.013 -1280.0*** 
 (422.7) (0.031) (226.8)    
   CBHI -176.2 -0.033** 619.3*** 
 (313.8) (0.016) (134.2)    
   PSNP 7.16 -0.012 45.18    
 (399.4) (0.023) (238.0)    
   2nd Consumption Quintile (Ref: 1st Quintile) 352.1 -0.027* -14.89    
 (255.5) (0.014) (109.3)    
   3rd Consumption Quintile 981.8*** 0.002 129.2    
 (267.4) (0.015) (143.5)    
   4th Consumption Quintile 1501.3*** -0.017 -386.6**  
 (287.0) (0.016) (158.5)    
   5th Consumption Quintile 1974.6*** -0.001 139.8    
 (316.9) (0.017) (185.1)    
   Informal Education (Ref: No Education) 1241.0*** 0.033 -334.0*   
 (421.3) (0.022) (199.0)    
   Primary Education 890.9** -0.002 -218.1    
 (394.3) (0.020) (262.6)    
   Secondary & above Education 1897.6*** -0.019 -889.3*   
 (627.1) (0.035) (535.4)    
Demographic characteristics    
   Household size 763.5*** 0.005 195.6*** 
 (112.3) (0.006) (68.39)    
   Land cultivated 1928.0*** -0.008 -0.804    
 (199.2) (0.007) (85.41)    
   Experienced shock  -611.7*** 0.049*** -192.2*   
 (211.4) (0.012) (115.8)    
Financial participation and networks    
   Saving in bank account 893.9*** 0.0165 59.78    
 (327.2) (0.015) (109.1)    
   Member of Iqqub 686.1* -0.043** 16.36    
 (379.8) (0.020) (170.2)    
   Member of credit & saving association  -32.74 0.261*** 297.4**  
 (339.2) (0.021) (132.4)    
   Official position held 359.1 0.009 -111.1    
 (265.4) (0.014) (116.6)    
N 12,820 12,820 3,840 
Adj. R-sq 0.049 0.043 0.176 
Notes: Full estimates from specifications for Columns 6-8 of Tables 11a and 11b. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
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Table A5 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on health care utilization: Children, older adults and full sample 
 Children (<15 years) Older adults (65 and above) Full sample  
 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Number of visits 
to modern health 
facility 
Modern health care 
utilization (1/0) 
Number of visits to 
modern health 
facility 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Number of visits to 
modern health facility 
CBHI*PSNP 0.033** 0.046* 0.117 0.269 0.041*** 0.042* 
 (0.016) (0.027)    (0.098)    (0.194)    (0.013) (0.025)    
CBHI -0.001 -0.006  0.014  -0.034 0.013* 0.037**  
 (0.010) (0.015)    (0.060)    (0.116)    (0.008) (0.015)    
PSNP -0.010 -0.008 -0.096* -0.144 -0.013 -0.023 
 (0.011) (0.018)    (0.055)    (0.121)    (0.009) (0.016)    
N 9,029 9,012 835 825 23,255 23,133 
Adj. R-sq 0.006 0.004 0.025 0.009 0.008 0.008 
Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, education, crop land 
ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
Table A6 
Effect of CBHI on health care utilization, off-farm labour supply and asset accumulation: PSNP sub-sample  
 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Number of visits 
to modern health 
facility 
Participation in off-
farm work (1/0) 
Number of hours 
worked off-farm 
Value of livestock 
assets (Birr) Loan uptake (1/0) 
Outstanding loan 
(Birr) 
CBHI 0.040* 0.041 0.10*** 8.03** 78.59 -0.014 -433.9*  
 (0.023) (0.042) (0.031) (3.86) (463.9) (0.039) (216.8)   
N 2,590 2,590 2,590 2,590 2,590 2,590 1,067 
Adj. R-sq 0.021 0.010 0.036 0.042 0.0061 0.041 0.140 
Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles education, crop land ownership and 
experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial institution. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01. 
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Table A7 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on health care utilization by source 
 
Modern health 
care utilization 
(1/0) 
Modern health 
care utilization 
from Health 
Centers (1/0) 
Modern health care 
utilization from 
Health Post (1/0) 
Modern health care 
utilization from 
Public Providers 
(1/0) 
Modern health 
care utilization 
from Private 
Providers (1/0) 
CBHI* PSNP 0.046** 0.034** 0.002 0.041** 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) 
CBHI 0.023* 0.033*** -0.0001 0.025** 0.0003 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) 
PSNP -0.017 -0.028*** 0.004 -0.031** 0.009** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
N 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,820 12,794 
Adj. R-sq 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.003 
Notes: Specifications include individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, 
education, crop land ownership and experience of shock), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size) and access to formal and informal financial 
institution. Standard errors in pare  
Table A8 
Effect of CBHI and PSNP on livestock assets: livestock & borrowing   
 
Value of livestock 
assets (Birr) Loan Uptake (1/0) 
Amount of loan 
(Birr) 
CBHI*PSNP 963.0 -0.010 -856.3*** 
 (731.9) (0.046) (280.2) 
CBHI -222.0 -0.042* 430.4* 
 (435.7) (0.025) (238.0) 
PSNP 103.0 -0.019 134.9 
 (759.1) (0.039) (302.5) 
N 4,589 4,589 1,323 
Adj. R-sq 0.024 0.040 0.125 
Notes: Specifications include fixed effects, time fixed effects, woreda-specific time trends, socioeconomic characteristics (consumption quintiles, household head 
education and crop land ownership), time-varying demographic characteristics (household size and composition), access to formal and informal financial institution. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at kebele level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <0.01.ntheses are clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
<0.01. 
 
